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Abstract
Elitisation in Cambodian civil society and how such processes relate to holding elite status in the state, electoral politics,
and economic fields, is poorly understood. This article seeks to identify different pathways to becoming an elite within and
beyond Cambodian civil society. We focus on four case studies, representing different forms of organisations within the
sectors of agriculture and youth. Three main questions are explored. Firstly, we identify different forms of capital needed
to reach elite status in civil society. Secondly, we explore how elite status within civil society is related to elite status within
other fields, by identifying three pathways of boundary-crossing (Lewis, 2008a) from civil society into the state, electoral
politics, and economic fields. Thirdly, we map the perceived possibilities and limitations of each field. In exploring these
questions, this article argues for a reappraisal of Cambodian civil society, shifting attention to the networks and platforms
that fall outside of the dominant focus on professional NGOs. By empirically tracing how elites move between fields, it as-
pires to provide a better understanding of the contours of, and relations between, civil society and other fields (including
government, electoral politics, and business), including in terms of what particular forms of power pertain to each.
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1. Introduction
In academic accounts, Cambodian civil society is of-
ten treated as a relatively self-contained field, locked
in an uneasy relationship with an authoritarian state.
Though civil society is understood to be diverse, less for-
mal groups are poorly understood and under-researched
(Coventry, 2016). Elitisation within civil society has con-
sequently been studied in terms of NGOs’ account-
ability (Dosch, 2012) and their difficulty in establish-
ing grassroots links (Khlok, Phoumim, & Vanna, 2003;
Malena & Chhim, 2009). This leaves out important pat-
terns of elite formation within and beyond Cambodian
civil society today. Whilst it is well-recognised that civil
society is marked by power dynamics (Mosse, 2005),
the development of civil society elites remains rela-
tively unexplored in academic literature. Processes of
elite formation in civil society display interconnections
and sometimes interdependence with other fields, as
well as instances of boundary-crossing between them.
In this article, we set out to identify different pathways
to leadership within and beyond Cambodian civil soci-
ety. What are some of the different pathways to elite
status in Cambodian civil society? How is elite status
within civil society related to elite status within other
fields? What range of possibilities are afforded through
civil society activity, which sets it apart from activity in
other fields?
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There is a growing realisation in the literature on
Southeast Asia that civil society activists may choose
between different arenas for engagement. Jayasuriya
and Rodan (2007) hold that in Southeast Asian hy-
brid regimes, state-sponsored modes of participation (in
which participants exert political influence over public
policy, through e.g., community consultation over policy-
making or nominated members of parliament) form a
continuum with civil society expression (collective ac-
tions in spaces not created by state actors). In Weiss’s
(2017) reworking, three principal spaces are available
for activists: autonomous civil society, extra-electoral
state-sponsored or institutional spaces, and electoral pol-
itics. In this article, we trace processes of elite boundary-
crossing towards becoming formally incorporated into
the state, electoral politics, and economic fields. Our in-
terest in elite movement between these fields reflects
our observation that it is substantial. It also reflects our
different approach to elites’ aims and ambitions. We do
not, like Weiss (2017), assume that activists primarily re-
spond to political opportunity structures in choosing dif-
ferent pathways of engagement, “weighing not only rela-
tive risks and the relative degrees of access that various
routes afford but also the nature of the claims that they
seek to press and ongoing feedback from intended tar-
gets” (Weiss, 2017, p. 383). We keep the motivations for
elite boundary-crossing open, acknowledging that this
may be a goal in itself, and that other fields may be pri-
oritised over civil society.
Our departure point is an understanding of civil so-
ciety which focuses on the nature and aims of activities
rather than organisational characteristics. Civil society is
here understood in broad terms as a space at the nexus of
formal politics, family structures, andbusiness; as a realm
of voluntaristic, generally collective and self-supporting
activity, however structured, which seeks to provide or
secure public and collective good, and is separate from,
and in its ideal form autonomous from, the state (Weiss,
2017, p. 377). Our approach is in line with an emerg-
ing realisation that the concept of civil society needs to
be “operationalised” in Cambodia (Henke, 2011; Waibel,
2014; Wells-Dang, 2014), where a great deal of activity
fitting the above description takes place outside of for-
mal NGOs.Waibel (2014, pp. 8–9) quoting Hannah (2007,
p. 94) argues that research needs a shift to “looking at
who within a society/state constellation is undertaking
which civil society activities and who is accomplishing
which civil society objectives,” and that Cambodian social
actors themselves should define which state-society rela-
tionships and activities are important. Shifting our object
of study to organisations, networks, and platforms which
have a significant influence through civil society activities,
we take actors’ accounts of their relationships and activi-
ties as a starting-point, agreeing with Waibel (2014, p. 1)
that “‘tracking’, as opposed to ‘pinning down’, civil soci-
ety should be the long-term goal of academic inquiry.’’
Contemporary scholarship of Cambodian civil soci-
ety has pointed to a relatively weak social force which
counterbalances the state to promote democracy and a
pro-poor reform agenda (Hughes, 2003; Un, 2004). The
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) has in different incarna-
tions dominated the Cambodian state apparatus since
1979, using the profits from land and natural resources
on the periphery to fund service provision and rural de-
velopment projects across Cambodia. Studies during the
2000s concluded that Cambodian NGOs were polarised
into two groups: a strident and confrontational ‘advo-
cacy’ wing ineffectually protesting hot political issues
such as land conflict, human rights, and natural resource
governance; and quiescent service-delivery NGOs work-
ing closely with the government to fill gaps in service pro-
vision (Malena & Chhim, 2009; Ou & Kim, 2013).
Significant recent changes to Cambodian civil so-
ciety have resulted in new dividing lines in terms of
relations with the state, which bear on patterns of
elite formation and boundary-crossing. During the 2000s,
NGOs gradually expanded activities into rural areas,
and international NGOs with expatriate staff were re-
placed by local NGOs with Cambodian leaders (Öjendal,
2014). Community-based organisations (CBOs) were es-
tablished in rural villages, often funded by and work-
ing closely with NGOs. The expansion of CBOs and in-
creased interactions between NGOs and CBOs initially
started with saving groups and self-help associations in
the agriculture sector among subsistence farmers. Local
saving and self-help groups are welcomed by authorities,
but only as long as they are not engaged in rural mobil-
isation on contentious issues or party politics. Emerging
grassrootsmobilisations in these areas are unequivocally
treated with suspicion. The escalation of land conflicts
and common resource enclosure has given rise to a new
strategy of network-based activism (Henke, 2011; Young,
2019). This new strategy also reflects the frustration of af-
fected communities with professional NGOs whose sup-
port for local grievances has so far been limited and ten-
tative (Thon, Ou, Eng, & Ly, 2009).
Demographic change has also significantly impacted
the civil society landscape. The children of a post-war
baby boom became eligible to vote in large numbers by
the time of the 2013 national elections, in which youth
were a majority of the electorate. Seeing its support sig-
nificantly weakened in the election, the CPP reasoned
that preserving its dominance required urgent action
to reformulate the political strategy in a manner that
could co-opt significant sections of young voters (Eng &
Hughes, 2017). The government has rampedup efforts to
engage youth in a range of primarily social and cultural
activities through state-sponsored platforms and mass
organisations. Yet, there are also independent youth ini-
tiatives to create platforms to address social and politi-
cal issues.
New Cambodian civil society elites are consequently
emerging who are more politically engaged and en-
meshed than the previous generation of expatriate
NGOs, and who navigate a variety of organisational
forms, including networks, mass organisations, and plat-
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forms. To understand these novel civil society dynamics,
including the contours of and relations between civil so-
ciety and other fields, it is necessary to investigate who
emerges as civil society elites and the dynamics driving
boundary-crossing between fields.
2. Conceptualising Elites, Fields, and Capital
Bourdieu’s theory of elites continues to provide a fruit-
ful theoretical starting point for elite studies (e.g.,
Korsnes, Heilbron, Hjellbrekke, Bühlmann, & Savage,
2017). Following Bourdieu, we understand elites not
in terms of formal leadership positions, but as groups
and individuals who control disproportionately large
amounts of different forms of capital. Positions in so-
cial space are based on the overall amount of capital
agents possess, the composition of capital, and their so-
cial trajectory (Heilbron, Bühlmann, Hjellbrekke, Korsnes,
& Savage, 2017, p. 6). Bourdieu (1986, p. 243) distin-
guished between economic, cultural, and social capi-
tal. Economic capital refers to money and ownership,
whereas cultural capital can refer to an embodied state
(such as tastes and lifestyle), an objectified state (cul-
tural goods), or an institutionalised state (e.g. educa-
tional qualifications). Social capital is “the aggregate of
the actual or potential resources which are linked to pos-
session of a durable network of more or less institution-
alised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recog-
nition” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248). Each member of the
network is backed by its joint volume of capital (eco-
nomic, cultural, or symbolic), which functions as a “cre-
dential” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 249). Following Khan (2012,
p. 365), we include two further forms of capital: politi-
cal and knowledge capital. Political capital focuses on the
management of “political transitions,” whilst knowledge
capital refers to “ideas, knowledge, and ideology” (Khan,
2012, pp. 366, 370).
Capital is mobilised by agents to stake claims and ac-
cess specific positions within particular social domains,
fields (Bourdieu, 1986). For Bourdieu, the concept of
field reflects a historical process whereby fields of ac-
tivity have been differentiated into specialised profes-
sions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), for example, politi-
cal, economic, bureaucratic, religious, medical, scientific,
and artistic. They, therefore, correspond to “familiar divi-
sions of action into self-contained realms of endeavour”
(Martin, 2003). In line with this rationale, we conceptu-
alise civil society, the state, the realm of electoral politics,
and the economic field as different fields.
The fields that have crystallised are relatively au-
tonomous spaces eachwith their own specific structures,
which determine the specific effects of capital (Bourdieu,
1989). Each field has its own internal logic as to the
“nature of the game” and is therefore analytically dis-
tinct (Martin, 2003). Yet fields are permeable, in the
sense that hierarchical positions of power are replicated
between fields through the conversion of capital. For
Bourdieu (1986, p. 242), this refers to “forms of exchange
which ensure the transubstantiation whereby the most
material types of capital—those which are economic in
the restricted sense—can present themselves in the im-
material form of cultural capital or social capital and vice
versa.” Actors seek to reproduce capital and their posi-
tions “by means of the conversions least costly in terms
of conversion work and of the losses inherent in the con-
version itself” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 253).
We understand elites not only in terms of the re-
sources they control or have access to but also in terms
of how these can be converted into different forms of
capital and transferred across fields, and what the ex-
change rates for such transfers are (Khan, 2012, p. 362)
The value and transferability of resources are defined
through social processes (Khan, 2012, p. 362). The state
plays a part in these and may advance or hold back civil
society groups by gatekeeping the pathways to become
an elite in civil society and beyond.
3. Methodology and Introduction to the Cases
This research builds on a qualitative case study approach,
in which patterns within our framework of field the-
ory were identified from a set of heuristic case studies
(George & Bennet, 2005, p. 75). For each case study, we
studied elite formation by examining recruitment and ap-
pointment procedures, including the value and conver-
sion rates of different forms of capital in such processes.
A second analytical focus was on elite interaction and
elite integration between civil society elites and elites
from other fields. This included the processes through
which civil society leaders cross over to take up leader-
ship in other fields, spending and gaining what capital,
and at what conversion rates. Different forms of capital,
as well as pathways to leadership within and beyond civil
society, were identified inductively.
Fieldwork was carried out in Cambodia between
September 2018 and December 2019. In-depth case
studies were carried out of six organisations, four of
which are discussed here. Data was collected through in-
terviews, observations, and document analyses. About
40 semi-structured interviewswere carried outwith both
leaders and ordinary members of the four organisations.
Questions focused on the themes of elite formation
and elite interaction. A number of comprehensive ‘life-
work history’ interviews were carried out with boundary-
crossers who had crossed from civil society to other
fields. Following Lewis (2008b, p. 565), this is an adap-
tation of the life-history method by which “in order to in-
vestigate the sector boundary-crossing phenomenon, ex-
periences of work (whether in terms of formal career, ac-
tivism, volunteering) were placed at the centre of the life-
history data to be collected.” As argued by Lewis (2008b,
p. 564), the life-history method can illuminate instances
of boundary-crossing in and out of civil society, shed-
ding light on “the types of relationships and forms of
power that link structures and processes across the sec-
tors” by documenting “the motivations and experiences
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of those who have crossed over,” and seeking “to ex-
plore the broader meanings and implications of these
movements.” Life histories also illustrate how capital be-
comes contingent on the fields inwhich they are situated
(Park, Rinke, & Mawhinney, 2016). With the permission
of the interviewees, interviews were recorded and tran-
scribed. Writing up our study, we faced the dilemma of
balancing a precise presentation of findings with expos-
ing respondents’ identities (Baez, 2002). As pointed out
by Lancaster (2017, pp. 95, 99), notions of authority, sen-
sitivity, and vulnerability are fluid and relational between
the researcher and participant in elite interviewing, and
the small sampling frames of key individuals means that
they are “vulnerable” in the sense that they could be
identifiable even when anonymised. Recognising that
elites may in interviews be “vulnerable elites” (Smith,
2006), we have anonymised them and the four organ-
isations, although none of the boundary-crossers inter-
viewed requested anonymity.
An inherent problem of the life-history method is
that subjective accounts are necessarily co-produced by
the informant,whoparticularly as an elitemay seek to ex-
ert control over the research process (Smith, 2006), and
the researcher-author, who decides what is included or
omitted in an account and how it is framed. We have
sought to redeem this by constantly reflecting on such
power issues throughout the research process (Lewis,
2008b, pp. 562–563). Finally, life-history data also sets
limits on generalisation. We agree with Bron and West
(2000, p. 159, as cited in Lewis, 2008b, p. 560) that indi-
vidual narratives “reflect and constitute the dialectics of
power relations and competing truths within the wider
society,” and can link personal experience with patterns
of institutional change if taking into account the plausi-
bility of the evidence, triangulation with other evidence,
and an understanding of the historical content (Lewis,
2008b, p. 561).
Engaging in case research, we have not sought to se-
lect cases that are directly representative of diverse pop-
ulations (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 30), but offer instead
a set of in-depth case studies reflecting different types of
elitisation processes. A set of interviews during an initial
pilot studymade it possible to draw a broad picture of the
main forms of boundary-crossing in Cambodia, and then
to identify specific individualswho corresponded to these
(cp. Lewis, 2012, p. 161). Our case studies are drawn from
the youth and agriculture sectors, which illustrate the
emerging civil society dynamics outlined in the introduc-
tion. They represent different types of organisation, rang-
ing from network-based types to discussion platforms;
they also have different relations with the state; and in
terms of boundary-crossing, offer intersections with the
state, electoral politics, and economic fields.
Youth Discussion (YD) identifies as an informal weekly
political discussion forum for young people that seeks
to cultivate a democratic political culture in Cambodia.
Established in 2011 by a group of four friends, the forum
had had over 2500 participants by 2020, including over
400 regular attendees. YD has attracted much media at-
tention, which has propelled key members into civil soci-
ety elite status andmade them interlocutors for their gen-
eration among international media, international organi-
sations, and the diplomatic community. Whilst it is inde-
pendent, it is treated with some suspicion by the govern-
ment and it suspended its activities for several months
when authoritarianism hardened in September 2017.
Cambodian Ideas (CI) describes itself as a new social
platform, presently centred around a debate and public
speaking contest for Grade 12 and university students. It
was founded in 2017 by six young elites in different sec-
tors. Whilst CI claims to be an independent initiative, the
Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia (UYFC), which
describes itself as an NGO but which functions as an un-
official youth branch of the dominant CPP, has acknowl-
edged the CI as one of its initiatives (UYFC, 2019). CI is
run in partnership with the Ministry of Education, Youth,
and Sport (MoEYS).
Farmer Center (FC) is an organisation made up of
farmers’ networks, founded in 1997. By 2014, it pro-
vided direct assistance to about 160,000 families in 22
Cambodian provinces. FC focuses on agricultural innova-
tion knowledge sharing with local farmers, farmer asso-
ciations, and young entrepreneurs. Founders and grass-
roots have formed the backbone of a political party,
founded in 2015.
Cambodian Rice (CR) is one of Cambodia’s largest
rice exporting companies, founded in 2011 by a former
NGO leader. Operating as a successful social enterprise
with 10 000 farmers registered under a contract farming
scheme, the entrepreneur works extensively with farmer
associations.
4. Pathways to Elite Status in Cambodian Civil Society
In this section, we identify the different forms of capital
needed to reach elite status, as well as the role that in-
teractions with and engagement in other fields has in ac-
quiring such status.
4.1. Youth Discussion
Centred on a weekly discussion forum, YD counts as
its members those who are involved on a weekly basis.
Membership is open to anyone. The leadership structure
is made up of four generations of core members, but
this arrangement is not well known, even among mem-
bers. The core membership has expanded only gradu-
ally and slowly. The first generation counts the four co-
founders, who started YD in 2011; the second genera-
tion 16 core members, recruited around 2014; a third-
generation four core members, recruited in 2018; and a
fourth-generation also four coremembers, announced in
2020. Recruitment to core membership is informal, and
generally by consensus rather than election.
Core members identified three main selection crite-
ria, corresponding to different forms of capital, for ap-
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pointment. First among these is social capital in the form
of trust. Whilst YD is non-partisan, and its core mem-
bers and participants represent different political lines,
the government has viewed YD with suspicion. The con-
sequent fear of recruiting a core member who might
seek to break up YD from inside has led to some hesi-
tation to take on new core members. This dilemma also
precludes there being a formal core member recruit-
ment process. Three out of four first-generation core
members have attended the Royal University of Phnom
Penh’s Department ofMedia and Communication (DMC),
and they recruited like-minded people whom they were
acquainted with having shared the same social net-
works. Consequently, the second generation leadership
included several journalists and a blogger, and in the
third generation, three out of four core members have a
DMC connection. Personal acquaintance prior to joining
the YD forum is not a criterion: several second and third-
generation core members benefitted from trust due to
belonging to similar social circles only. The second form
of capital is knowledge capital, in the form of political in-
terest. According to co-founder Sophal, he verifies that
potential core members take an interest in politics and
political issues, stating that “any background is fine as
long as you are interested in politics.” Similarly, other
coremembers charged that coremembersmust share an
interest in political engagement as this is necessary for
organising and participating in the forum. A third crite-
rion identified by core members is activity/engagement,
which can be understood as a form of knowledge capital.
For example, one coremember, whowas not acquainted
with any other coremember before attending the forum,
was asked to become a coremember, which she believes
was because she had been vocal in forums with high pro-
file commentators.
One co-founder, Sophal, has emerged as a key civil so-
ciety actor, drawing primarily on knowledge capital which
then allowed him to accumulate social capital within the
field. Growing up in rural Pursat, Sophal secured several
scholarships which enabled him to study at three differ-
ent Cambodian universities. Winning a scholarship from
the Indian embassy, Sophal went on to study political sci-
ence in India where he gathered students for small group
discussions about Indian local politicswhich triggered the
idea of YD. Returning to Cambodia, Sophal made appoint-
ments at coffee shops with friends to debate politics, at-
tracting NGO sponsorship in the form of a space for dis-
cussion. Core members attribute his leading role to his
activity, in the forum and on Twitter; his social capital,
in terms of being well known and having many connec-
tions; his knowledge capital, in terms of skills in political
analysis; his transparency; and his commitment in guid-
ing youth on personal, academic, and forum issues.
4.2. Cambodian Ideas
CIwas founded in 2017 by six young elites in different sec-
tors including education, economics, health, and culture.
The six founding members are known as the “founders”
and make up the board of CI. The board has delegated
executive powers to an executive team, headed by the
managing director and co-founder, Dara.
For the leadership level of CI, as with YD, social cap-
ital in the form of trust is paramount, but in contrast to
YD, the social networks it is drawn from penetrate the
state. These networks are built through youth volunteer-
ing activities sponsored by the ruling CPP and theMoEYS.
The six founders had been friends since their participa-
tion in the elite Ship for Southeast Asian and Japanese
Youth programme, a youth exchange programme or-
ganised by the Cabinet Office of Japan and Southeast
Asian governments, including the Cambodian govern-
ment. One of the founders, Kanitha, then Director of the
Administrative Department at Pannasastra University of
Cambodia (PUC), invited fellow UYFC-member and for-
mer President of the Pannasastra Student Senate Dara
to join in organising CI because of his extensive experi-
ence in debate and public speaking. Further recruitment
went through Dara, who relied on his personal networks.
For the selection of the executive team, Dara selected
several positions and advertised the remaining positions
among his networks through groups on WhatsApp and
Telegram. A technical team of nine mentors in debate
and public speaking were then handpicked by him (in-
terview with Dara). The connections that these recruit-
ments built on were mainly forged through youth volun-
teering in three associations: the Cambodian Red Cross,
Cambodia Scouts, and UYFC. All of these are patronised
by the ruling CPP and have close links to state structures,
primarily through the MoEYS. The joint capital of these
networks functions as a ‘credential’ which constitute so-
cial capital for each member.
For the first two CI seasons, 80 candidates were se-
lected out of 180 and 989 applicants respectively. The
forms of capital required for selection mirrored those
of YD. Possessing social capital, in the form of the trust
granted by in-group membership, was the most funda-
mental criterion. The program was advertised through
the personal networks of the founders on Facebook,with
the result that applicants were largely drawn from these.
The second was knowledge capital. Applicants were ex-
amined through an exam, which counted for 80% of the
assessment and focused on general knowledge of social
science subjects including politics, economics, history,
and culture. The third part of the assessment was an in-
terview, focusing on commitment, confidence, manner,
alongside content and analysis.
Being selected as a CI contestant arguably means join-
ing an elite which although formed within civil society
is inherently looking to forge connections across fields.
Contestants gain in social capital through networking op-
portunities with representatives from other fields: min-
istries, companies, and NGOs are regularly consulted dur-
ing preparation for the contests. Two experts, one from
the government, one from the NGO sector, alongside two
technical experts act as judges; for the final, the Minister
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of Education, Youth, and Sport himself served as a judge.
Many contestants interviewed see the main benefit of CI
as internal networking, forming a community which de-
scribes itself as a “family” in which the founders are re-
ferred to as “father” and “mother.” From the perspective
of the founders, the main outcome they wish to see is a
close-knit community of capable youth bound by friend-
ship to take on leading positions across the economic, civil
society, and state fields. In the words of one co-founder:
“Almost all my children are now spread out. They work
in good companies, NGOs, and Ministries, which I am so
happy about” (interview with Kanitha). The co-founders
intend to create leadership across fields, tying together
future political, civil society, and economic elites.
4.3. Farmer Center
The leadership group of FC was a product of donor
projects established in the 1990s. FC was set up by a
well-educated French Cambodian working for a French
NGO. He came from a family with strong links to the polit-
ical elite, who returned to Cambodia after the 1991 Paris
Peace Accords. Since FC was founded with support from
the French NGO in 1997, he served as chair of its board.
A team leader for the French NGO, Som, was appointed
as the first-generation leader of FC.
FC is governed by a board of directors with repre-
sentation from the development sector. The leadership
group of the organisation consists of core staff members
whomanage key divisions within the organisation. These
are individuals who are tied to and were inspired to join
FC by Som, a charismatic and visionary leader. Somdraws
on social capital in various ways to hold this status. He
has a long-term vision for the agricultural sector and ru-
ral farmers in Cambodia. One is “Making the changes for
the farmers to be successful in their enterprise that could
make them a tycoon farmer (Sethy Srok Srae).” He has
planned to set up a system to connect the urban and ru-
ral populations in Cambodia through capital investment
of urban people into rural farmers’ enterprises. In his
own words, “the goal is to attract the rich to invest in FC
projects and in agriculture so that Cambodia can improve
the food production system” (interview with Som).
Som draws extensively on his knowledge capital, as
one of very few Cambodians with PhD training abroad as
an agronomist during the 1990s. He has therefore been
highly sought after by NGOs and donors as well as gov-
ernment officials for advice and expertise in rural devel-
opment. His personal character also contributes to his
elite status. He is a highly trustworthy individual who
commands respect. Senior staff at FC described him as a
caring and down to earth personality, who is passionate
about changes at the community level, where he spent
most of his time sharing his knowledge with local farm-
ers. This long-term presence and direct interaction with
farmers and communities provide important social cap-
ital, not only to mobilise support from farmers but also
to influence state actorswhoneeded FC’smanpower and
rural community resources. The trust of a large number
of rural farmers awards Som and FC with political capital
that Som and his team used to mobilise voters for their
newly established political party (see below) in local and
national elections in 2017 and 2018. Som thus success-
fully converted knowledge capital and social capital into
political capital.
4.4. Cambodian Rice
Deth is the co-founder and president of CR. Founded
in 2008, CR has grown from a struggling family-owned
milling business to Cambodia’s leading producer and ex-
porter of organic rice. Deth’s business strategy depends
on collaboration with local farmers and the farmer asso-
ciations through civil society organisations. In order to
meet rice export requirements, CR works with 10,000
farmers through contract farming, ensuring that farmers
are committed to the company in exchange for guaran-
teed purchase, price, and technical assistance. Contract
farming is not new in Cambodia: it was introduced by
NGOs, international donors, and the government as a top
priority. Nonetheless, the partnership rarely works due
to high levels of distrust between farmers and compa-
nies and the lack of farmers’ capacity to meet the con-
tractual requirements.
Deth attributes his company’s success to bringing
his network of civil society organisations and interna-
tional donors into play when working with government
policymakers and smallholder farmers (interview with
Deth). His previous work was exclusively in the civil so-
ciety sector, including as secretary general of Cambodia
Against Child Trafficking; Save the Children Cambodia;
and project officer of the NGO Terre des Hommes.
Previous civil society roles and engagement provided so-
cial capital in the form of relations to a wide range of
key development actors in Cambodia. High-profile donor
projects, including a United Nations Youth Millennium
Development Goals project, enabled his public involve-
ment interacting with high ranking government officials,
development partners, and civil society organisations.
His reputation in the civil society field also helped him
build trust with rural actors, including rice farmers.
Deth’s accumulation of economic capital has further
improved access to government officials, reliant on pri-
vate sector partnership and financial resources for pol-
icy implementation. Through this exchange, he has be-
come quite influential in the policy circle which has, in
turn, helped to garner support from his business peers,
as demonstrated by his election to lead the Cambodia
Rice Federation in 2019. His social, economic, and politi-
cal capital have thus reinforced one another during inter-
actions with the business and state fields.
5. Boundary-Crossing
There are three main pathways of boundary-crossing
within our case studies. The first pathway is that of elite
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civil society actors, crossing over to the field of electoral
politics by converting capital accrued in the civil society
field. In the case of FC, long-time director Som crossed
over to electoral politics. In 2014, during a time of po-
litical impasse and search for alternatives to Cambodia’s
political polarisation, he co-founded a network which
united civil society leaders around the goal of promoting
more democratic party politics. The New Party emerged
out of the network the following year. Its top positions
were occupied by civil society elites: Whilst Som be-
came the New Party’s Program Director, former NGO
directors became its President and Secretary General.
Ahead of the next national election in 2018, a party
congress elected Som almost unanimously as the Prime
Ministerial Candidate. Since the main opposition party,
the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), had been
dissolved the previous year, the New Party expected to
mobilise votes from CNRP supporters.
In building his career in electoral politics, Somdrewon
the connections and trust established with FC grassroots.
The very rationale of the New Party was to channel grass-
roots leadership from the civil society sector into political
leadership positions. Consequently, also grass-roots level
activists tended to be veteran civil society activists, with a
very high proportion coming from FC. Field visits in 2018
showed that some local headquarters were used as de
facto party headquarters, and interviews also suggested
that NewPartymemberswere recruited through FC struc-
tures. In around 14 communes out of 27 where the party
was active inMay 2017, local leaders had previously been
involved with FC. The connections formed with the grass-
roots thus formed the bulwark of support, which enabled
Som’s boundary-crossing to electoral politics.
A second pathway is for civil society elites’ status
to cross over to the state field. Here, actors converted
social capital as the ‘credential’ bestowed by in-group
membership in networks spanning the state, to political
capital pertaining to policy-making positions. This path-
way is exemplified by CI co-founder Kanitha. A self-made
civil society elite, from the age of 12 Kanitha had volun-
teered for the three main organisations patronised by
the ruling CPP and to different extents sponsored by the
MoEYS: the Cambodian Red Cross, the Cambodia Scouts,
and the Youth Association of Cambodia, which in 2012
became the UYFC. In 2012, Kanitha was promoted from
a province-level activist to the UYFC central committee.
In co-founding the CI, Kanitha’s crowning achievement
in the civil society field, Kanitha mobilised the estab-
lished networks she had built through state-sponsored
youth volunteerism.
Another crucial resource Kanitha mobilised was her
control over access to youth. Kanitha held the key po-
sition of Director of Administration for the well-known
PUC in Phnom Penh, acting as a gatekeeper to the
University by liaising between the PUC, the MoEYS, and
the UYFC. The UYFC has been able to spread at the uni-
versity level by recruiting key individuals in student rep-
resentative bodies, who then initiate a UYFC presence at
the university in question. Kanitha connected with Dara,
former President of student association Pannasastra
Student Senate (PASS), who also happened to be the
brother of the head of the UYFC volunteers at theMoEYS.
As the two took leading roles in creating CI, most PASS
members, particularly the debate club, joined. Through
Kanitha and Dara, the UYFC had thus established a sig-
nificant presence at PUC. Kanitha was rewarded with an
appointment as a full-time staff member in the UYFC.
Equally impressed by her work for CI, the Minister
of Education, Youth, and Sport then appointed Kanitha
as Director General of Youth, specifically requesting
her to develop a similar program through the Ministry.
According to Kanitha,many people have criticised her ap-
pointment to the highest technical-level position there is
in theMinistry, which ordinarily requires decades of pub-
lic sector experience. The Minister of Education, Youth,
and Sport however routinely dismisses such criticism, by
pointing to her experience in the civil society field. In this
case, access to youth constituted a form of social capital
that enabled boundary-crossing to the state and the con-
version to political capital.
A third pathway is that of a civil society elite cross-
ing the boundary into the economic field. This route
is exemplified by Deth, president of CR. In 2012, Deth
left the civil society field, turning his wife’s family busi-
ness to CR. The company grew very fast from 2013 to
2020, going from four family members with five staff
to 200 staff, and increasing its profits from $6 million
to $40 million. The success of the company was facili-
tated by Deth’s former elite status in civil society. His
social capital, in terms of connections with donors and
NGOs, enabled cooperation with Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Agence Française
de Développement, and other donors which made the
initiative successful. From 2013 onwards, the Ministry
of Commerce supported the company, with the World
Bank and International Finance Corporation following
suit in 2014. CR received a 100% grant to implement its
capacity-building projects with rice farmers. Other fac-
tors also contributed to CR’s success, most importantly
the government’s 2010 policy for exporting rice as well
as the fact that Cambodia received preferential trade sta-
tus from the EU under the Everything But Arms scheme
from 2001 onwards.
Establishing himself as a leading figure in Cambodia’s
private sector, Dethmobilised his economic capital to be-
come an oknha (tycoon), a title bestowed by royal de-
cree to economic elites who invest specified amounts
in government development schemes. The oknha title
institutionalises an elite pact between the Cambodian
economic elite and the CPP leadership, by which the
oknha receive privileges and opportunities in their busi-
ness ventures in return for financial contributions to the
CPP state (Verver & Dahles, 2015). Economic capital is
thus converted into social capital in terms of mutual
trust with state elites, which boosts further economic
capital accumulation and bestows a certain political cap-
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ital in terms of influence on economic policy-making.
Deth is regularly invited by the government to negotia-
tion meetings with international investors, and much of
his work focuses on building connections with the lat-
ter. He enjoys close relations with high ranking govern-
ment officials in various powerful ministries: Commerce,
Economy and Finance, and Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries. Members of his board of directors include gov-
ernment advisers and high-ranking officials from these
ministries and the Supreme National Economic Council,
the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, and
the Ministry of Environment. He is also President of the
Cambodia Rice Federation, which created in 2014 serves
as a club of main elites in the rice export sector, and is
chaired by a son of former deputy PrimeMinister Sok An.
A second pattern is when civil society elites refrain
from boundary-crossing. Among our case studies, this
pattern was exemplified by YD, for which relations with
the state and overall social relations played a role in shap-
ing this outcome. No coremember interviewed reported
having established relations in government through YD;
interactions with government officials were confined to
when the latter were invited to speak at the forum. The
state field is thus relatively impermeable to YD lead-
ers (although one core member had become a civil ser-
vant). Even remaining as a civil society elite, co-founder
Sophal has accrued significant political capital as a self-
defined “political entrepreneur.” Sought after by the
media for political commentary, Sophal is cherished by
the diplomatic community and a frequent guest at sev-
eral embassies.
Whilst the YD leadership does not aspire to cross to
the state or electoral politics fields, its larger agenda is
to prepare members to become future elites in electoral
politics and the state. According to co-founder Sophal,
the mission of the forum is to build the critical thinking,
public speaking, and analytical skills of youth, so as to cul-
tivate a democratic culture to replace an alleged political
culture of infighting. That task necessarily remains within
civil society confines for him, but has boundary-crossing
ambitions into the electoral politics and state fields for
YD participants. According to Sophal, YD is a “kind of
investment” to turn politically ambitious young people
into “political entrepreneurs.” Although these are not yet
members of political parties or government officials, “be-
cause they know they are not ready yet,” it is “up to them
when they think they are ready to go.” In Sophal’s words,
“I keep telling them: ‘If you want to be a politician, you
need to be capable, have the financial resources, enough
network, good knowledge and skills.’” Sauf financial cap-
ital, YD is designed to provide social and knowledge cap-
ital, to later be converted into political capital.
6. The Perceived Possibilities and Limitations of
Different Fields
There was a perception among boundary-crossers that
the state field offers unparalleled possibilities to effec-
tuate social change. Boundary-crossing to the state field
was motivated by a perception of it having a higher level
of impact than the civil society field. For Kanitha, cross-
ing to the state was prompted by a sense that policy-
making was more impactful than UYFC work. This is per-
haps surprising, given the increasingly prominent role
of the UYFC, and indicates the continued primacy of
holding government positions. Kanitha perceived that
work in the state field offered the opportunity to en-
gage in similar initiatives to those in civil society writ
large. Her work as Director General of Youth has thus
focused on upscaling and mainstreaming youth volun-
teering initiatives, including a planned national debate-
contest, modelled on CI, to involve all Cambodian high
schools. Comparing work at theMoEYS with work at PUC
and for the UYFC, Kanitha stressed the greater responsi-
bility that came with occupying a policy-making position
(interview with Kanitha).
Boundary-crossing to the electoral politics field was
similarly motivated by a perception that it offers greater
potential to effectuate change than the civil society field,
although only if crossing into the state field is the fi-
nal destination of the individual. In the case of Som, his
move to electoral politics was prompted by his desire to
work at a national policy-making level. Working with FC,
he stated, he could help only a small number of farm-
ers, whereaswinning an election to lead the government,
he would be able to help farmers nationwide. Another
strong reason that compelled him to cross to electoral
politics was his conviction that “politics should not just
be about elite competition” (interview with Som). The
New Party was established to provide a platform for ordi-
nary Cambodians such as farmers and grass-roots civil so-
ciety leaders to become involved in politics, which should
lead to them holding public office. He also cited the vul-
nerable position of his organisation as the government
is suspicious of its grassroots organising, and its poor fi-
nances, as comparing unfavourably to work in govern-
ment. However, his boundary-crossing experience to op-
positional politics has yielded only negative results so
far. New Party performed poorly in local elections 2017
and national elections 2018, winning 0.07% and 1.11%,
respectively. FC has also suffered from the move of its
founder to electoral politics, as it is treated with increas-
ing suspicion by the government which closely monitors
its activities, to the point that the network is now in a pro-
cess of disintegration. This suggests that in the absence
of cordial relations with the state, boundary-crossing to
electoral politics is a high-risk endeavour.
Cambodia’s rapidly expanding economic field has at-
tracted both new and established civil society elites.
According to Deth of CR, his decision to leave civil soci-
ety was prompted by a realisation that there were more
opportunities to help poor farmers in the private sector
through contract farming. Deth described his effort in the
private sector as “a new world which is starkly different
from CSOs in that CSOs always wait for sponsors, while
the private sector carries out their work independently,
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using their own capital” (interview with Deth). He now
enjoys greater flexibility to implement his own vision and
initiative without having to ask for permission and sup-
port from sponsors. Operating within the economic field
is however not without limitations, particularly in rela-
tions with the government. He has been able to over-
come initial suspicion and build trust with the state by
investing in forming a long-termpartnershipwith govern-
ment institutions, both through formal project collabo-
rations as well as through financial contributions to sup-
port government projects. The oknha systemhas thereby
allowed him to become a state “insider.”
Also the accounts of those who remain within the
confines of civil society give important insights into the
perceived possibilities and limitations of the civil society
field. The commitment of Sophal of YD to stay within civil
society is founded in a conviction that there he is best po-
sitioned to create a training ground for future boundary-
crossers to move into the fields of the state and electoral
politics. This orientation again points to the primacy of
electoral politics and the holding of public office. It also
suggests that absent the embedment in social relations
which span the state, civil society is navigated as a field
where different forms of capital can be accrued that can
later be mobilised and converted to cross over into the
state and electoral politics fields. In 2018, YD applied to
the Ministry of Interior to register as an NGO, intending
to produce future “political entrepreneurs.” The request
for registration was rejected, with the unofficial reason
given that the inclusion of the word “political” in the
NGO’s namewas inappropriate—signalling the state’s re-
jection of the boundary-crossing ambition. Core mem-
bers then jointly came up with the idea of opening their
own coffee shop as a venue for forums. This preference
for a form of social enterprise strategy again highlights
civil society’s reliance on funding as a perceived limita-
tion. YD’s current meeting space is offered by a foreign
foundation on its premises, though core members unan-
imously reported that the foundation has never affected
the running of the forum or discussions to date. Still,
core members considered a coffee shop to present both
an economic opportunity for members to become share-
holders and a means of becoming completely indepen-
dent of external funding demands.
7. Conclusion
Our key aim in this article is to illuminate pathways to
leadership in Cambodian civil society and beyond. The
patterns of elite formation and boundary-crossing that
have been identified likely reflect durable trends, point-
ing towards the future architecture of Cambodian civil
society. As foreign funding gradually declines, domestic,
politically enmeshed elites will have to navigate diverse
organisational forms and social relations with versatility.
Yet whilst the article seeks to shine new light on contem-
porary civil society dynamics in Cambodia, its implica-
tions are extensive. The framework we propose for trac-
ing and making sense of elitisation within and beyond
civil societies can be broadly applied.
To become a Cambodian civil society elite, our study
suggests the key importance of social capital. Arguably,
this points to the role of networks characterised by mu-
tual trust in a “controlled civil society,” where there is
a range of “authoritarian control mechanisms and re-
strictions on oppositional politics and associational life”
(Uhlin, 2016, p. 43). Social capital is accrued not only
within civil society but also through networks spanning
the state, electoral politics, and economic fields.
Cambodia offers an interesting comparison from the
perspective of what enables and motivates boundary-
crossing in an authoritarian regime with a “controlled”
civil society. In the wider region, patterns of boundary-
crossing from civil society to the state have been iden-
tified in the Philippines (Lewis, 2008a) and Indonesia
(Haryanto, 2020;Mietzner, 2013), in both cases following
democratic openings which enabled a new role for civil
society figures. Our four case studies revealed patterns
of boundary-crossing from elite status in civil society to
elite status in the state, electoral politics, and economic
fields. Primarily social capital proved to be convertible so
that the presence or absence of credentials bestowed by
in-group membership in networks spanning the authori-
tarian state shaped patterns of boundary-crossing.
Attention to boundary-crossing gives a picture
of an outward-oriented, rather than inward-looking,
Cambodian civil society field. Lewis (2008b, pp. 570–574)
distinguishes between two archetypes of boundary-
crossers: “‘the role-based identity,” in which a person’s
priority is simply to follow the job, with no long-term
concept of the preferred sector, and the “sector-based
identity,” in which individuals are “guided primarily by
a sense of belonging to, or identifying with, the third
sector,” but make an exploratory sojourn in the public
sector. All three boundary-crossers here discussed defy
this conceptualisation. Two of the boundary-crossers
displayed strong preferences for the state field and one
for the economic field, considering them more efficient
fields of action to bring about change. Even the platform
without high-level boundary-crossing was motivated by
an aspiration for its members to take up roles in electoral
politics and/or the state. The picture that emerges is the
primacy, in some quarters of Cambodian civil society at
least, of electoral politics andwinning government office.
Throughout these processes of elite formation and elite
interaction, the state plays a key role in advancing and
alternatively holding back civil society groups. It does so
by gatekeeping pathways to becoming elites in civil soci-
ety and beyond, by defining the value and transferability
of resources.
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